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ABSTRACT
During a hurricane, an individual’s risk perception does not remain static. Spatial
and temporal variations of a hurricane will shift perceptions of risk, and complicating this
dynamic are information-seeking processes increasingly reliant on the individual’s selfmotivated interpretation of information sources. Initial evacuation resistance or willingness
could change even after evacuations are ordered, affecting evacuation preferences and
departure times. Because Hurricane Matthew’s continually shifting track had virtually
nonstop coverage, evacuation decisions were also being modified as residents either grew
more or less certain of their safety.
This research investigates the evacuation behaviors associated with Hurricane
Matthew in October of 2016. It assesses the relationships between selected variables
acquired from an online survey and evacuation departure times – generally speaking, the
differences in evacuation behaviors between Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina survey
respondents. Descriptive statistics are provided for several variables of interest, followed
by spatiotemporal analysis of evacuation departures using Esri ArcGIS® software’s spacetime pattern mining tools. To assess the relationship of a subset of variables and evacuation
during the entire study period (5 days), a binary logit model is estimated, and subsequently,
to investigate the relationship of several variables and evacuation by day, four additional
binary logit models are estimated and discussed.
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Results indicate that approximately 62% of the Florida sample, 77% of the Georgia
sample, and 67% of the South Carolina sample evacuated. Under the logistic model
analyzing the overall time period, an observed evacuation depended on not having prior
hurricane experience, having received an evacuation order, an increased level of
communication about the evacuation order, believing one lived in an evacuation zone, not
knowing if one lived in an evacuation zone, having fewer pets in the household, and higher
household income in 2015. However, the state (FL, GA, SC) was the only variable which
was significant for each of the four days’ logistic regressions. Essentially, for each day,
there were consistent differences in evacuation between the states.
Some of the results concerning the influence of some variables on evacuation behavior
have been confirmed in past research, while others continue to emphasize the case-specific
nature of every hurricane event through inconsistently influential variables. The descriptive
results provided makes clear that a number of variables are taken into consideration in a
household’s decision to evacuate, but the results from the subsequent analyses highlights
that an authoritative evacuation order is the primary triggering variable. The results also
show the significance of the state variable on coordinating an evacuation at the household
level, which stresses the criticality of recommending protective action in a timely manner.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The 2016 Atlantic hurricane season began with the anomalous mid-January
Hurricane Alex and closed with the late-November Atlantic-Pacific Hurricane Otto. For
the Southeastern coastal regions of the United States, Hurricane Matthew (September 28 –
October 9 2016) presented the final direct impact from the 2016 hurricanes. Matthew
became a tropical storm on September 28, west northwest of Barbados; it developed into a
category 5 storm in the Caribbean making it the strongest Atlantic storm of the 2016 season,
and also the deadliest (Stewart, 2016). In the U.S, Matthew’s path severely impacted the
eastern coasts of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, while heavy rain
and wind brought about flooding and wind damage in the interior parts of these states.
Some models showed Matthew threatening to make direct landfall at various points along
the southeast coast while others showed the storm moving parallel to the coastline. These
forecasts constantly updated as Matthew continued along its track. When the western half
of Matthew was over Cape Canaveral, FL, for example, it was a category 3 hurricane.
While the storm moved north, parallel to the coastline, it continued to weaken and finally
made U.S landfall as a category 1 hurricane near McClellanville, SC (Stewart, 2016), near
where Hurricane Hugo made landfall in 1989. Approximately 1-4 days before the hurricane
was projected to begin seriously impacting Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas, the
Governors of these states ordered evacuations for multiple counties along the coasts.
There are numerous variables involved in an individual’s or household’s evacuation
decision-making process. Hurricane Matthew’s actual path and timeline, shifting projected
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tracks and strengths, and broader spatial and temporal contexts illustrates the spatial and
temporal differences in the evacuation behaviors along the eastern coasts of Florida,
Georgia, and South Carolina. The ongoing coverage of Matthew’s continually shifting
track meant individual and household decisions to evacuate or remain were also being
continuously updated, thereby affecting evacuation departure times. As such, Hurricane
Matthew presents an interesting case for analyzing the spatiotemporal stages and variables
affecting the hurricane evacuation decision-making process.
This research aims to identify and analyze the most significant variables that drove
the spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation behaviors during Hurricane Matthew in
October 2016.
Research Question 1: Were there any spatial and temporal differences in the Hurricane
Matthew evacuation behaviors (e.g. compliance, departure times, destination) along the
eastern coasts of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina?
Research Question 2: If so, a) what were the differences, and b) are there individual
and/or household-level variables that could explain such variations, especially in the
amount of time between warning issuance and the initiation of protective action?
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 2 details the hurricane evacuation
literature and the existing research on variables influencing evacuation behavior and
decision-making processes, as well as the significance of departure timing and household
evacuation preferences. Chapter 3 discusses the data and methodologies used, including a
description of the study area and survey, the method used to spatially analyze differences
in departure times, and the setup of five binary logistic regression models. Following,
Chapter 4 provides the results of the survey, comprising descriptive results, results of the
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space-time analysis, and results of statistical tests and logit models. Chapter 5 discusses
the results and supplies some qualitative data, not only to buttress the results of the
regressions but enhance and provide another dimension of the survey respondents’
experiences, which statistical results do not convey.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Consensus on Variables Influencing Evacuation Behavior
Because variables and responses change from one storm to the next, there is
extensive literature on hurricane evacuation behaviors dating back decades (Baker 1991;
Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a). The influence of the work of
Baker (1991) helped lay a foundation for a variety of research work concerning the driving
variables behind hurricane evacuation behaviors. In his 1991 analyses of hurricane
evacuation behaviors and variables of survey respondents for twelve hurricanes in a variety
of geographic locations within the Southeastern United States, he found that, among
numerous other factors, the differences in evacuation behaviors were generally explained
by the individual’s perception of risk, or the held beliefs of the hazardousness of an area.
Later research confirmed the importance of storm-specific physical factors in an
individual’s decision to evacuate or remain (e.g. Dow and Cutter 1998; Whitehead et al.
2000; Smith and McCarty 2009; Stein, Dueñas-Osorio, and Subramanian 2010; Bowser
and Cutter 2015).
Much of the literature confirms the significance of recommendations of protective
actions from public officials in prompting evacuations (Whitehead et al. 2000; Dow and
Cutter 1998; Stein, Dueñas-Osorio, and Subramanian 2010; Bowser and Cutter 2015;
Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a). In other words, authoritative evacuation
recommendations positively affect evacuation behaviors. Huang et al.’s (2016) statistical
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meta-analysis of over 49 actual and hypothetical evacuation studies since Baker’s (1991)
analyses enhanced the current understanding that local officials are, indeed, vital and
influential sources of information in evacuation decision-making at the household level,
and that an official warning is consistently positively correlated with evacuations.
Several other variables are consistent in terms of their significance on evacuation
behaviors, such as private vehicle ownership for traveling to a variety of sheltering options,
and the type of housing of a resident (Baker 1991; Dow and Cutter 1998; Smith and
McCarty 2009; Lindell, Kang, and Prater 2011; Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang, Lindell,
and Prater 2016a). Bearing weak, inconsistent, or no direct significance on hurricane
evacuation behaviors are some demographic factors, like age, gender, or race; previous
hurricane experience; exposure to previous false alarms; and previous participation in
shadow evacuations (Baker 1991; Dow and Cutter 1998; Whitehead et al. 2000; Arlikatti
2006; Smith and McCarty 2009; Stein, Dueñas-Osorio, and Subramanian 2010; Lindell,
Kang, and Prater 2011; Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a; Huang,
Lindell, and Prater 2016b). Even general hurricane awareness, such as knowing where one
is in relation to risk area, is inconsistent – Zhang et al. (2004) and Arlikatti et al. (2006)
conducted studies of Texas coastal residents and found different proportions of respondents
were able to correctly identify their risk areas on provided maps, but correct identification
of risk area was found to be uncorrelated with evacuation expectations. However, an
individual’s perception of risk could very well be mediated by, or interact with, some of
these more inconsistently correlated variables (Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016b).
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2.2 Consensus on Variables Influencing the Decision-Making Process
While the reception of official warnings and storm-specific physical factors
consistently and significantly influence evacuation behaviors, people must seek out this
information or acquire these data through various channels before ultimately making a
decision (DeYoung et al. 2016; Bowser and Cutter 2015). Therefore, when studying
evacuation behaviors it is also important to look at the decision-making process: the
consumption of information, social interactions and cues, and the decision that follows
such processes. Updated communication technologies change the modalities of
information consumption. During a hurricane’s approach, another facet of evacuation
processes is information-seeking and “milling” (Mileti and Peek 2000; Eiser et al. 2012);
that is, more information on the hurricane is both disseminated and sought out. The
“milling” process is evolving with the proliferation of web-based information outlets and
social media, although the manner in which it may be affecting evacuation behaviors is as
yet unclear (Bowser and Cutter 2015). Seeking information fills gaps in knowledge, but
also confirms what is already thought to be known, furthering independence in decisionmaking. This independence may suggest a smaller dependence on official advice; although
official recommendations for evacuating are very much a significant influence on the
individual’s final decision to evacuate or remain, it is prudent to consider it as one piece of
information considered in the decision-making process.
People seek information on storm-specific characteristics, and those characteristics
correlate with decisions to evacuate or remain in an area (Huang, Lindell, and Prater
2016a). A risk-communication disconnect with regards to layperson interpretation of
knowledge products presents a challenge. If the interpretation of the information is faulty,
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perhaps the most appropriate actions would not be undertaken by the individual. For
instance, during Florida’s 2004 hurricane season, with landfalling hurricanes Charley,
Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, the black track line within the cone of uncertainty became the
primary focus for many, while others interpreted the boundaries of the cone of uncertainty
to signify the area of danger (Broad et al. 2007). This is an important finding to consider
when Hurricane Charley’s track shifted and brought the hurricane to Cayo Costa near Fort
Meyers and Punta Gorda – well within the cone of uncertainty, but not the target of the
black track line (Pasch, Brown, and Blake 2004; National Weather Service 2006). People
in those areas were largely caught unprepared, even when watches and warnings were
disseminated at least 23 hours before landfall (National Weather Service 2006),
demonstrating the significance of individual and/or household-level information-seeking
and interpretation when making the decision to evacuate or remain.
An additional consideration when studying hurricane evacuation behaviors and
information-seeking is the dynamic nature of the landscapes in which populations operate,
since the behaviors may not remain static. Demographics of study areas should also be
considered, since an area with low residential turnover rates could respond to hurricanes in
different ways compared to an area with a large transient population. A longer residency
in an area could lend itself to a higher likelihood of prior hurricane experience, which could
lead to different evacuation behaviors when compared to areas which have a greater
number of new incoming residents who may have no prior hurricane experience (Kang,
Lindell, and Prater 2007). On the other hand, and largely missing from evacuation literature
are analyses of important subgroups like transient populations (Lindell, Kang, and Prater
2011; Bowser and Cutter 2015). A recent piece of research that may shed some light on
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this matter is a survey conducted by Cahyanto et al. (2016). The study of Florida tourists
revealed that a lack of hurricane knowledge, due to tourists’ inherent transience, increased
the likelihood of information-seeking processes (Cahyanto et al. 2016). Increased
information-seeking from a potentially vulnerable subgroup such as tourists, who may not
have an established social network in the place they visit, would emphasize the need for
clear and easy-to-interpret hurricane knowledge materials. Thus, while seemingly
tangential to actual evacuation processes, it is also important to look at informationseeking, knowledge-confirmation processes, and the subsequent translation into action or
non-action when studying evacuation behaviors.

2.3 Departure Timing and Evacuation Preferences
Not only is it important to assess who evacuates and why, but also who evacuates
and why they do it when they do, as well as how they do it. While much of the hurricane
evacuation literature may address the variables that influence the decision-making process
and the subsequent choice to evacuate or remain, there seems to be less certainty in terms
of the human factors that influence the variability in hurricane evacuation timing. Studies
on evacuation timing often assume full evacuation compliance, no processes of shadow
evacuation, various vehicle occupancies, natural and even dispersion on evacuation routes
(Lindell and Prater 2007), or simultaneous evacuations (Sbayti and Mahmassani 2006).
Other studies focus on infrastructural or network problems with little regard to the
behavioral aspects that play a significant role in the departure timing and evacuation
preferences of an individual or household (Pel, Hoogendoorn, and Bliemer 2010).
However, there are a few exceptions, for example, a study on Hurricane Ivan evacuation
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dynamics investigates physical and demographic variables contributing to household
decisions to evacuate, and decisions on when to leave (Sarwar et al. 2016).
The common assumptions in many evacuation timing studies may run counter to
actual occurrences, such as the evacuation process during Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Dow
and Cutter (2002) analyzed some of the main contributors to the severe traffic problems
encountered during the evacuation from the hurricane. The intense congestion which
manifested on major interstates in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina was partially due
to the intensity and forecasted path(s) of Hurricane Floyd, prompting calls for evacuations
in all three states. In South Carolina, the congestion was also a result of about half of the
evacuees departing in the same 6-hour window, about a quarter of the evacuees taking more
than one vehicle, and most traveling further than necessary to ensure safety (Dow and
Cutter 2002).
Further, Mileti and Sorensen (2015) postulate a lag time – the Protective Action
Initiation Time – between when warnings are issued and when residents begin to take
protective actions such as evacuation (Figure 2.1). The lag time exists because of the need
to take preparatory actions, such as making accommodations elsewhere, compounded by,
for instance, the presence of pets, children, elderly family members, or those with physical
ailments, but some of it is also a function of residents seeking confirmatory information on
the nature of the threat, clarity of the warnings, the time of day the warning is received,
length of residency in the area, or yet other reasons (Mileti and Peek 2000; Lindell and
Prater 2007; Dixit et al. 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 2015). However, the delay does not
occur for all residents who do decide to evacuate, as some residents choose to leave before
an official warning or evacuation order has been mandated for their area, depending on
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their interpretation of storm threats or expectation of related issues, such as traffic
congestion. It is therefore necessary to examine whether household characteristics partially
explain differences in evacuation, not only with regards to compliance, but also evacuation
preferences and departure timing.

Figure 2.1 Timeline of warning issuance and initiation of protective
action.
Source: Mileti and Sorensen, 2015: 2. A Guide to Public Alerts and
Warnings for Dam and Levee Emergencies, Davis, CA: USACE. URL:
https://silverjackets.nfrmp.us/Portals/0/doc/WarningGuidebook_USA
CE.pdf?ver=2015-08-10-213008-520
The research questions concern the existence of any spatial and temporal
differences in evacuation behaviors during Hurricane Matthew, pinpointing what the
differences actually were, and if there are household-level variables that could explain the
differences, especially time of departure, akin to the study conducted by Sarwar et al. 2016.
While this thesis does not attempt to fully model evacuation behaviors, because every
hurricane and evacuation response is different from one event to the next, this thesis does
build on and attempts to contribute to existing hurricane evacuation literature by taking
into account variables that influence evacuation, decision-making, and timing of household
evacuation.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGIES
3.1 Study Area
The Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute (HVRI) in the Department of
Geography at the University of South Carolina, and HVRI affiliates (Dr.’s Christopher
Emrich and Jamie Mitchem) at the University of Central Florida and University of North
Georgia, respectively, collaborated to study coastal residents’ evacuation responses to
Hurricane Matthew along the eastern coast of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, which
became the study area, due to the context of the storm. To elaborate, hurricane watches and
warnings were put in place along the coast of the study area as Hurricane Matthew
advanced. Appendix A details NHC advisories 26 through 43, as they were the advisories
with the first and last watch or warning of the study areas. The first watch occurred on
Tuesday, October 4th; the first warning occurred on Wednesday, October 5th, in Florida.
The last warning and watch were in place for parts of South and North Carolina.
Additionally, because of the intensity of the hurricane and the continued threat presented
by it, multiple evacuations were ordered for coastal residents in all three states.

3.2 Official Recommendations for Protective Action
Voluntary and mandatory evacuations were recommended or ordered by multiple
county officials along the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coasts. Table 3.1 shows
only the recommendations or orders for the study area. However, there were more
evacuation orders disseminated by other counties than what is shown in the table. These
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data were collected long after Hurricane Matthew occurred, from state government or
emergency management websites, or online news media articles. Typically, original times
of the orders are not published, and instead, the article or posting might have only the date
or an update time (where the original post time is removed or overwritten). Because of this,
the dates and times of the orders are approximate and only serve to provide the “big picture”
of how the Hurricane Matthew evacuation played out. In general, of the three states, South
Carolina coastal residents received the first notice on Tuesday, October 4th, of a mandatory
evacuation to begin Wednesday, October 5th. Florida coastal residents began receiving
orders on Wednesday, October 5th, while Georgia coastal residents began receiving orders
on Thursday, October 6th.
Table 3.1 Evacuation recommendations/orders and times for FL, GA, and SC coastal
counties
STATE COUNTY
LOCATIONS /
TYPE
DATE ORDERED
ZONES
(NOTES)
FL
Brevard1,2
Barrier islands
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3:00
PM, 10/5)
FL
Duval1,3
A
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as
voluntary)
FL
Duval1,3
B
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as
voluntary)
FL
Duval1,3
C
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as
voluntary)
FL
Flagler1
A
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as
voluntary 10/5, mandatory
by 10/6)
1
FL
Flagler
B
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as
voluntary 10/5, mandatory
by 10/6)
FL
Indian
Barrier islands,
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
River2
mobile homes,
8:00 AM 10/6 as
low-lying areas
mandatory; began as
voluntary 10/5)
FL
Martin2
Sewall's Point
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun)
FL
Martin2
Hutchinson Island Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun)
2
FL
Martin
Jupiter Island
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun)
2
FL
Martin
Mobile homes
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun)
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FL

Nassau2

A

FL

Nassau2

C

FL

Nassau2

F

FL
FL
FL

Palm Beach2
Palm Beach2
St Johns2

A
B
A

FL

St Johns2

B

FL

St Johns2

F

FL

St Lucie1,2

Barrier islands,
low-lying areas

FL
FL

St Lucie1
Volusia2

East of U.S. 1
Beachside, lowlying areas, RVs,
mobile homes

GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA

Bryan4
Camden4
Chatham4
Glynn4
Liberty4
McIntosh4
Above
counties4
Beaufort5
Berkeley5
Berkeley5
Charleston5
Charleston5
Charleston5
Colleton5

East of I-95
East of I-95
East of I-95
East of I-95
East of I-95
East of I-95
West of I-95

Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM)
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 10/5)
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 10/5)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM 10/6 as
mandatory; began as
voluntary 10/5)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM 10/6 as
mandatory; began as
voluntary 10/5)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM 10/6 as
mandatory; began as
voluntary 10/5)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin 10/6
as mandatory; began as
voluntary 10/5)
Voluntary 10/5/2016 (Have begun)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at
6:00 AM 10/6 as
mandatory; began as
voluntary 10/5)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning)
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning)
Voluntary 10/6/2016 (Morning)

A
B
G
A
B
C
A

Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory

SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
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10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)

Mandatory 10/6/2016 (“Effective
immediately” 10/6)
Dorchester5 B
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
Dorchester5 D
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
5
Dorchester
E
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
5
Dorchester
F
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
Georgetown A
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin 12:00
6
PM)
6
Horry
A
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin 12:00
PM)
5
Jasper
A
Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM)
7
Jasper
B
Mandatory 10/6/2016 ("Effective
immediately" 10/6)
https://www.flgov.com/2016/10/05/47411/
https://www.flgov.com/2016/10/05/gov-scott-issues-updates-on-hurricanematthew-preparedness-efforts-as-storm-approaches-florida-3/
https://www.wokv.com/news/local/county-countyevacuations/EZPRnwk5crlzzmXQRVIsjJ/
https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/atlanta/hurricane-matthew-strengthens-as-itapproaches-florida/454047157
http://scemd.org/component/content/article/11-home-page/news/240-matthewnews-release-4
http://scemd.org/component/content/article/11-home-page/news/245-matthewnews-release-8
http://scemd.org/component/content/article/11-home-page/news/247-matthewnews-release-9
Colleton7

SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

B

3.3 Survey Method
Following previous, standard post-hurricane assessment surveys, HVRI and HVRI
affiliates (Dr. Christopher Emrich at University of Central Florida and Dr. Jamie Mitchem
at University of North Georgia) mailed a total of over 45,000 postcards to coastal residents
in select Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina counties (Figure 3.1). North Carolina was
omitted from the study area due to lack of resources, and storm track and strength (Figure
3.2). Random addresses were provided by Infogroup®, a data analytics services provider.
The postcards provided a link to an online survey platform provided by SurveyMonkey®.
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Figure 3.1 Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coastal counties from which
addresses were randomly selected to receive the hurricane evacuation survey.
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Figure 3.2 Coastal counties from which addresses were selected. NHC Best Track
(color) and NHC 5-day Forecast Line and Cone for Advisory 22 (first mention of
Florida) for Matthew displayed east of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coastline.
Shapefiles downloaded from NHC.

The survey instrument itself consisted of standard, behavioral hurricane evacuation
questions pertaining to topics like prior experience, risk area awareness, information
sources, influences on behavior, and general demographic questions (see Appendix B). The
delivery method (i.e. online survey) was thought to provide a quicker approach to assessing
responses, namely in the minimized data entry (i.e. from handwritten survey response to
digital copy for statistical analysis) and costs (e.g. less paper and less mail weight).
However, it could have contributed to the low response rate (less than 2%), as web-based
surveys fairly consistently provide low numbers of respondents (Leece et al. 2004; Fan and
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Yan 2010), and on top of this, survey response rates appear to be decreasing over time
(Cull et al. 2005; Johnson and Wislar 2012). Further, the survey was accessible from
November to mid-December 2016, and influences such as the political and holiday season
during this time period may have also contributed to the low response rate.
The total sample size of n=697 breaks down as follows: FL n=225; GA n=159; SC
n=313. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the total responses received and the response
rates, with corresponding confidence intervals. Those who supplied a departure time sum
to an n=465 out of a total evacuation group of n=472 (in other words, several respondents
evacuated but did not provide us with a time of departure). Permission was granted to use
the survey data from Florida and Georgia, and all the returned survey data from FL, GA,
and SC were coded, standardized and consolidated for use in the analyses.
Table 3.2 Response Rates and Confidence
Overall
Postcards delivered
Responses received
Response rate (%)
Responses used
Total population in study area
Confidence interval of all
responses received

Florida

48,347
735
1.52
697
3,814,112
± 3.61

18,240
238
1.30
225
2,375,637
± 6.35

Georgia
10,278
168
1.63
159
465,135
± 7.56

South
Carolina
19,829
329
1.66
313
973,340
± 5.40

3.4 Space-Time Cube and Emerging Hot Spot Analysis
To help address RQ1 regarding spatial and temporal differences in evacuation
behaviors, Esri ArcGIS® software’s space-time pattern mining tools (Create Space-Time
Cube and Emerging Hot Spot Analysis) were used. Creating a Space-Time Cube
aggregates a set of points into space-time bins, in which the points are counted; in essence,
the trends are non-spatially assessed via the Mann-Kendall trend test, which analyzes data
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to determine if there is any upward or downward trend in the variable over time. The
Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool detects and evaluates trends (Table 3.3) over time by
calculating the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for each bin (Esri, Inc. 2016a; Esri, Inc. 2016b). The
respondent locations were used as the point data, and each respondent has an associated
departure value (date/time). The times provided to the survey respondent were in intervals,
so for the purposes of this analysis, the midpoint of every interval was used as the
timestamp. For example, if a respondent reported having left on Wednesday, October 5
between 6 AM and noon, the departure value would be 10/05/2016 09:00:00 AM. The
points were stratified by state before using the tool, and each space-time bin distance
interval was specified to 15 kilometers by 15 kilometers, and time intervals set to 6 hours.
Table 3.3 How Esri ArcGIS software’s Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool
categorizes each study area location.
Pattern Name
Definition
Does not fall into any of the hot or cold spot patterns
No Pattern Detected
defined below.
New Hot Spot

Consecutive Hot
Spot

Intensifying Hot
Spot

Persistent Hot Spot

A location that is a statistically significant hot spot for
the final time step and has never been a statistically
significant hot spot before.
A location with a single uninterrupted run of
statistically significant hot spot bins in the final timestep intervals. The location has never been a
statistically significant hot spot prior to the final hot
spot run and less than ninety percent of all bins are
statistically significant hot spots.
A location that has been a statistically significant hot
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals,
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity
of clustering of high counts in each time step is
increasing overall and that increase is statistically
significant.
A location that has been a statistically significant hot
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals with
no discernible trend indicating an increase or decrease
in the intensity of clustering over time.
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Diminishing Hot
Spot

A location that has been a statistically significant hot
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals,
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity
of clustering in each time step is decreasing overall
and that decrease is statistically significant.

Sporadic Hot Spot

A location that is an on-again then off-again hot spot.
Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals have
been statistically significant hot spots and none of the
time-step intervals have been statistically significant
cold spots.

Oscillating Hot Spot

A statistically significant hot spot for the final timestep interval that has a history of also being a
statistically significant cold spot during a prior time
step. Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals
have been statistically significant hot spots.

Historical Hot Spot

The most recent time period is not hot, but at least
ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been
statistically significant hot spots.

New Cold Spot

Consecutive Cold
Spot

Intensifying Cold
Spot

A location that is a statistically significant cold spot for
the final time step and has never been a statistically
significant cold spot before.
A location with a single uninterrupted run of
statistically significant cold spot bins in the final timestep intervals. The location has never been a
statistically significant cold spot prior to the final cold
spot run and less than ninety percent of all bins are
statistically significant cold spots.
A location that has been a statistically significant cold
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals,
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity
of clustering of low counts in each time step is
increasing overall and that increase is statistically
significant.

Persistent Cold Spot

A location that has been a statistically significant cold
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals with
no discernible trend, indicating an increase or decrease
in the intensity of clustering of counts over time.

Diminishing Cold
Spot

A location that has been a statistically significant cold
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals,
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity
of clustering of low counts in each time step is
decreasing overall and that decrease is statistically
significant.
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Sporadic Cold Spot

A location that is an on-again then off-again cold spot.
Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals have
been statistically significant cold spots and none of the
time-step intervals have been statistically significant
hot spots.

Oscillating Cold
Spot

A statistically significant cold spot for the final timestep interval that has a history of also being a
statistically significant hot spot during a prior time
step. Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals
have been statistically significant cold spots.

The most recent time period is not cold, but at least
Historical Cold Spot ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been
statistically significant cold spots.
Source: Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. 2016. How Emerging
Hot Spot Analysis works, Redlands, CA. URL: http://desktop.arcgis.com/en
/arcmap/10.3/tools/space-time-pattern-mining-toolbox/learnmoreemerging.htm

3.5 Binary Logit Models
To analyze the relationship between the binary response of evacuation/nonevacuation and selected variables based on existing literature, binary logit models were
estimated using SAS/SAT® software. The first models the probability of a household
evacuating over the entire study period. Of the questions asked in the survey, there were
originally 14 regressors (Table 3.4) selected for inclusion in the first model
(MODEL_ALLDAYS) because of their potential to change the probability of a household
evacuation. However, the data set with missing values presented significant limitations.
Missing values (e.g. from respondent omission, purposeful or accidental) often present a
problem in many analyses. Such incomplete cases are a challenge to deal with, and many
default statistical procedures will deal with incomplete cases using listwise deletion. Other
times, imputation of single values such as the mean can be carried out, but imputing one
value for all empty values biases estimates (Little and Rubin 1987) as it disregards the
uncertainty of the unknown values and should generally be avoided. In other cases, more
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advanced imputation techniques using expectation maximization, or multiple imputation
using simulated values are conducted to increase the number of usable (statistically valid)
cases, reflecting the uncertainty of unknown values. The imputation method to be used
depends on the pattern of missingness (i.e. monotone or arbitrary), the type of variable (i.e.
continuous, ordinal, or nominal), and whether the data is parametric or non-parametric
(Kang 2013).
Table 3.4 Variables selected for inclusion in the overall logistic regression model.
Variable
Description
Response
Category
STATE
Dummy variable; states
SC
1
FL
2
GA
3
PREEXP
Dummy variable; whether the
No
0
respondent has experienced a
Yes
1
hurricane prior to Matthew
EVACORDER Dummy variable; whether the
No
0
respondent received an order to
Yes
1
evacuate from hurricane Matthew
WHOSCORE Sum of the number of types of
See table 4.1 for 0-9
evacuation-information sources the specifics
respondent used (e.g. police,
media, governor, coworker,
employer, etc.)
HOWSCORE Sum of the number of types of
See table 4.1 for 0-9
evacuation-information modes the specifics
respondent used (e.g. social media,
radio, TV, newspaper, face-to-face
communication, etc.)
TELLSCORE Sum of the number of types of
See table 4.1 for 0-6
people the respondent told about
specifics
the evacuation order (e.g.
neighbor, friend, coworker,
employer, etc.)
EVACZONE
Dummy variable; if the respondent No
0
thinks they live in an evacuation
Yes
1
zone
Don’t know
2
FEMAZONE
Dummy variable; if the respondent No
0
thinks they live in a FEMAYes
1
designated flood zone
Don’t know
2
NLIVHH
Number of occupants in household Free response
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NAUTOHH
NPETS
HHINC2015

Number of automobiles owned by
household
Number of pets at household
Household income in 2015 as
ordinal variable (5 levels)

Free response

Free response
Less than 22,000
22,001 – 43,999
44,000 – 65,999
66,000 – 87,999
88,000 or more
HHU18*
Number in household under 18
Free response
HHO65*
Number in household over 65
Free response
*Removed from variable list to solve missing values problem

1
2
3
4
5

After paring down the variables to the ones thought to be of importance to the
analysis (i.e. all 14 variables in Table 3.4), variables containing a large amount of missing
data were then considered, and thought to be less essential to the analysis (the number of
household members under 18 and over 65 years of age). Because much of the missing data
came from these two items and were considered less essential to the analysis, these items
were removed, and missing values were not imputed and were only dealt with using the
default method of listwise deletion. Thus, for the first model, MODEL_ALLDAYS, 136
observations were deleted due to missing values and only 561 of the 697 observations were
used. If the two variables for the number of household members under 18 and over 65 were
kept in the analysis, and listwise deletion was used to deal with missing values, 306
observations would be deleted, and only 391 of the 697 observations would be used.
Essentially, the first logit model used the entire dataset with the 12 variables (i.e.
the variables in Table 3.4, except for HHU18 and HHO65). Four design variables were
created for STATE, PREEXP, EVACORDER, EVACZONE, and FEMAZONE (i.e. these
were identified as the categorical variables in the logistic procedure), with reference
(dummy) coding used to represent the class variables, and the last responses (e.g. “Yes” or
“1”; “Don’t know” or “2”) being used as the reference categories. The data were not
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separated into the days of the evacuation procedures, in order to understand which variables
led to any evacuation at all during the time period.
For the purpose of the evacuation-day-based logistic regression analyses, the full
data were used, stratified by day, to facilitate the estimation of four1 binary logit models,
with each model corresponding to a day (MODELD1 – MODELD4). These regression
analyses were conducted in order to assess the relationship between the binary response of
evacuation (but on each day) and a group of variables selected based on existing literature.
Of the questions asked in the survey, there were 9 regressors (Table 3.5) selected for
inclusion in the model because of their potential to change the probability of a household
evacuation in time interval t. The milling variables (WHOSCORE, HOWSCORE, and
TELLSCORE) were removed to decrease the number of listwise-deleted observations.
Table 3.5 Variables selected for inclusion in the four logistic regression models.
Variable
STATE

Description
Dummy variable; the order in which
states first issued any evacuation
order (SC-1; FL-2; GA-3)
PREEXP
Dummy variable; whether the
respondent has experienced a
hurricane prior to Matthew (No-0;
Yes-1)
EVACORDER Dummy variable; whether the
respondent received an order to
evacuate from hurricane Matthew
EVACZONE
Dummy variable; whether the
respondent knows they live in an
evacuation zone
FEMAZONE
Dummy variable; whether the
respondent knows they live in a
FEMA-designated flood zone
NLIVHH
Number of occupants in household
1

Response
SC
FL
GA
No
Yes

Category
1
2
3
0
1

No
Yes

0
1

No
Yes
Don’t know
No
Yes
Don’t know
Free response

0
1
2
0
1
2

Because only one respondent needed to evacuate on Saturday, October 8 due to flooding associated with
Matthew, the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist for the fifth day’s logistic regression model and
is thus invalid.
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NAUTOHH
NPETS
HHINC2015

Number of automobiles owned by
household
Number of pets at household
Household income in 2015 as
ordinal variable (5 levels)

Free response
Free response
Less than 22,000
22,001 – 43,999
44,000 – 65,999
66,000 – 87,999
88,000 or more

1
2
3
4
5

For MODELD1-MODELD4, 82 of the 465 evacuee observations were deleted and
only 383 observations were used in each of the four logistic regression models. STATE,
PREEXP, EVACORDER, EVACZONE, and FEMAZONE were identified as the
categorical variables in the logistic procedure, again with reference (i.e. dummy) coding
and “yes”/”1” responses being used as the reference categories. Attempts were made to run
the full logistic models including all nine variables, however, due to having a sparse
dataset, quasi-complete or complete separation of data points was detected and the model
convergence criterion were not always satisfied. Because of this, inferences about the
parameters would have been invalid. Therefore, forward selection was used on the daybased Matthew sub-datasets to identify the effects contributing to either an observation of
evacuating or not evacuating. The significance level selected for entry into the model was
0.15, to possibly include variables which have marginal evidence of changing the chance
of an evacuation. To provide an idea of how the sample breaks down, simple descriptive
results will be provided for select responses, but results from further analyses using Esri
ArcGIS® software’s space-time pattern mining tools as well as tests and logistic models
using SAS/STAT® software will follow.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Results
Descriptive results indicate that 62.2% of the Florida sample (total FL n=225),
76.7% of the Georgia sample (total n=155), and 67.1% of the South Carolina sample (total
SC n=311) evacuated (Figure 4.1). Overall, 69.6% of Florida respondents, 90.6% of
Georgia respondents, and 71.8% of South Carolina respondents said they received an
evacuation order (Figure 4.2), but a simple overlay analysis in a GIS shows that 89% of
our FL respondents, 100% of our GA respondents, and 84% of our SC respondents live in
hurricane evacuation zones.
One interpretation of the discrepancies between the percentage of those who
received the order to evacuate and the percentage of people who should have received an
evacuation order based on their location in an evacuation zone could be that some residents
were not aware of an evacuation order, so they think they did not receive one. However, it
could also be due to not all evacuation zones being called to evacuate. In other words, in
many coastal counties, sub-county evacuation zones are determined based on the location’s
proximity to the coast and local topography. Typically, evacuations are called for all zones,
or Zones A and B, or certain residents (e.g. those who live in mobile homes and low-lying
areas) (refer back to Table 3.1 for study area specifics).
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Did you evacuate in response to Hurricane Matthew?
90%
80%
70%

Percent

60%
50%

All

40%

Florida

30%

Georgia

20%

South Carolina

10%
0%
Yes

No

Response

Figure 4.1 Percentages of those who evacuated

Were you ordered to evacuate for Hurricane Matthew?

Percent

Total responses
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

All
Florida
Georgia
South Carolina
Received evacuation order

Did not receive evacuation
order

Response

Figure 4.2 Percentages of those who reported having received an
evacuation order

4.1.1 Evacuation Prompts
Of those who evacuated, 88.5% of Florida respondents, 93.4% of Georgia
respondents, and 84.3% of South Carolina respondents said they received an evacuation
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order (Figure 4.3 top), which essentially means some people evacuated without having
received the order to do so. Of those who did not evacuate, 38.8% of Florida respondents,
81.1% of Georgia respondents, and 46.1% of South Carolina respondents said they
received an evacuation order (Figure 4.3 bottom). The respondents from Georgia had the
highest percentage of people who did not or could not comply with the order. Because not
all zones were called to evacuate, in Florida, 67% of our survey respondents who actually
live in evacuation zones evacuated, and 24% who do not live in evacuation zones also
evacuated. In Georgia, all respondents live in an evacuation zone and 76% of them reported
having evacuated. In South Carolina, 73% of those who live in evacuation zones evacuated,
and 31% who do not live in evacuation zones also evacuated.

Were you ordered to evacuate for Hurricane Matthew?
Responses from evacuation group only
100%
90%
80%

Percent

70%
60%

All

50%

Florida

40%

Georgia

30%

South Carolina

20%
10%
0%
Received evacuation order

Did not receive evacuation order

Response
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Were you ordered to evacuate for Hurricane Matthew?
Responses from non-evacuation group only
90%
80%
70%

Percent

60%
50%

All

40%

Florida

30%

Georgia

20%

South Carolina

10%
0%
Received evacuation order

Did not receive evacuation order

Response

Figure 4.3 (top) Percentages of those who reported having received an
evacuation order, evacuation group (top); non-evacuation group (bottom)

Of the evacuation group, the survey asked what factors influenced the decision to
evacuate (Figure 4.4). For Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, the hurricane’s track was
the primary motivator (78.6%, 75.4%, 71.4%, respectively), with marginal to no significant
differences between the groups. The hurricane’s strength was an additional motivator for
Florida (78.6%), and a secondary motivator for Georgia and South Carolina (73.0%, and
57.1%, respectively) with strong evidence that the proportion of Florida respondents who
cited hurricane strength as an influential factor in evacuating was greater than the
proportion of South Carolina respondents (p=0), and strong evidence that the proportion of
Georgia respondents who cited hurricane strength as an influential factor in deciding to
evacuate was greater than the proportion of South Carolina residents (p=0.0018). The
difference between FL and SC, and GA and SC, may be due to the shift in classification
from “major hurricane” to simply “hurricane” along the Georgia coast. However, it is
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unclear whether the interpretations of “hurricane strength” were in regards to flood/surge
potential, wind potential, or both. The third-most respondent-cited motivating factor in
evacuating for FL, GA, and SC, was receiving a mandatory evacuation order (55.7%,
66.4%, and 55.7%, respectively). It is interesting to note the apparently tertiary influence
of mandatory evacuation orders on evacuation behaviors, especially since the evacuation
order times complement the departure times.

Which factors influenced your decision to evacuate? Please check all that apply.
Responses from evacuation group only
90%

80%
70%

Percent

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

All

10%

Florida

0%

Georgia
South Carolina

Response

Figure 4.4 Factors influencing the decision to evacuate
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4.1.2 Non-evacuation Prompts
Of the non-evacuation group, the survey asked what factors influenced the decision
to remain and not evacuate (Figure 4.5). For Florida, the primary factor contributing to
non-evacuation was the path of the hurricane (45%), followed by concern for property
(40%) and the strength of the hurricane (36%). Georgia respondents cited both the strength
and the track of the hurricane as primary factors for non-evacuation (65%), followed by
traffic concerns (41%). In South Carolina, the main influence for staying was the strength
(66%), followed by the path of the hurricane (47%), and concern for property (34%). With
regards to only the storm-specific factors (i.e. strength and track of the hurricane), there is
strong evidence that the proportion of Florida respondents who cited hurricane strength as
an influence in staying was less than the proportion of Georgia respondents (p=0.0015),
with a similar difference between Florida and South Carolina non-evacuees (p=0).
Which factors influenced your decision to remain and not evacuate? Please
check all that apply.

Percent

Responses from non-evacuation group only
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

All
Florida
Georgia
South Carolina

Response

Figure 4.5 Factors influencing the decision to not evacuate
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Additionally, there is strong evidence that the proportion of Georgia respondents
who cited the hurricane’s track as an influential factor in the decision to remain was greater
than the proportion of Florida respondents (p=0.0212), and also greater than that of South
Carolina respondents (p=0.0301). Interestingly, with regards to citing the hurricane
strength as a factor in not evacuating, there is no evidence of any significant difference
between the proportions of respondents from Georgia and South Carolina, presumably due
to the storm being classified as a non-major hurricane as it began its trek along the Georgia
coastline. Concerning the hurricane track, there is no strong evidence of any difference
between Florida and South Carolina, presumably due to the continued threat of landfall
along the Florida coast, and the eventual landfall in South Carolina. This suggests that
while 18 of the 22 NHC forecast uncertainty cones from Advisories #22 through #43
included the Georgia coastline, interpretations may be focused on the center track line.
These interpretations may be complicated by the slew of spaghetti models displayed by
various media outlets and websites.
Besides residents reporting not living in an evacuation zone for which an order was
called, some of the “other” (i.e. free response) responses were significant to note. A number
of responses mentioned elderly family members or friends for whom it would be difficult
to travel, physical disabilities of family or friends, infirmed family members or friends, or
being unable to drive great distances due to age. A number of other responses mentioned
the time it would take to be able to return home, being prepared to withstand hurricanes
(e.g. structural home protection, owning generators, supplies, etc.), or receiving the
evacuation order too late.
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4.1.3 Travel Behaviors
Of those who did evacuate, South Carolina had the greatest percentage of people
who evacuated to an out-of-state destination (56.9%, Figure 4.6). Disregarding the
availability of accommodations, simply regarding safety from storm surge and coastal
flooding, most coastal residents in a number of states would have to travel anywhere from
10-50 miles inland. The higher percentage of people in South Carolina who traveled outof-state is most likely due to the geography of the state as well as the extra lead time.
What city and state did you go to?
Responses from evacuation group only
Out of state destinations
60%

Percent

50%
40%
30%

Florida

20%

Georgia

10%

South Carolina

0%
Out of state destinations

Response

Figure 4.6 Percentages of people who evacuated to out-of-state destinations by state

However, there were a number of respondents from Florida and Georgia who also
traveled out-of-state. The spatial distributions of all three states’ points of origin (i.e. where
they live and from where they evacuated) and destination (i.e. where they went) are shown
in Figure 4.7. Using the midpoints of supplied travel time intervals, South Carolina’s
evacuees also experienced longer travel times, with an approximate average of 4 hours and
approximate median of 4.5 hours (Figure 4.8). Some of the longer travel times were likely
optional, because the contraflow evacuation procedures actually shortened the duration of
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Figure 4.7 Spatial distribution of evacuee residences/points of origin (top)
and destinations (bottom)
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travel to certain locations in the state; however, again, the out-of-state destinations would
be associated with the longer travel times. Another reason for having longer travel times is
also due to the geography of the state and the road networks. These circumstances (e.g.
contraflow, longer lead time, being able to choose where to go, clear communication)
possibly contribute to SC evacuees’ above average – excellent rating regarding how South
Carolina handled the hurricane evacuation (Figure 4.9).
Georgia had the lowest percentage of those who traveled to out-of-state destinations
(16.8%), but only just behind Florida (19.6%). Georgia evacuees traveled an approximate
average of 3.8 hours, or a median of 3.5 hours. The highest percentage of evacuees who
traveled less than one hour to their destination live in Florida, likely due to the geography,
and thus, transportation routes, of the state. On average, Florida evacuees traveled an
approximate average of 2.7 hours or a median of 2.5 hours.

How long (hours) did it take to reach your destination?
Responses from evacuation group only
30%

Percent

25%
20%
15%

All

10%

Florida

5%

Georgia

0%
Less
than 1
hour

1-2
hours

2-3
hours

3-4
hours

4-5
hours

5-6
hours

More
than 6
hours

Response

Figure 4.8 Travel time for evacuees by state
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South Carolina

How do you rate the state's overall handling of the hurricane
evacuation?

Percent

Total responses
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

All
Florida
Georgia

South Carolina
Very Poor

Below
Average

Average

Above
Average

Excellent

Response

Figure 4.9 Ratings of the states’ handling of the evacuation by state

4.1.4 Departure Times
Respondents who evacuated were asked the day and time of departure and were
provided with a total of 35 possible time intervals to choose from (Figure 4.10) and/or
choice of open response. For this analysis, only the responses that fell within the provided
choices were used, as some of the open response choices were early and for exogenous
reasons, such as vacations having been planned regardless of the hurricane’s impact, which
is not considered here as evacuation for the sake of evacuation. The 35 possible choices
consist of the 5 day span between Tuesday, October 4 and Saturday, October 8, and of 7
time segments (midnight-6am; 6am-9am; 9am-noon; noon-3pm; 3pm-6pm; 6pm-9pm;
9pm-midnight).
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Figure 4.10 Histogram of departure time steps beginning with Tuesday,
October 4th, between midnight and 6 AM (TS 1) to Saturday, October 8th,
between 9 PM and midnight (TS 35) with overlaid kernel density plot by
state.
Although the respondent-cited influences in evacuation were primarily the track
and strength of the hurricane, the more significant peaks in the kernel density plot for each
state in Figure 4.10 are associated with the evacuation orders given by those states for the
original 35 time steps. For South Carolina, the initial peak of evacuee departures between
time steps 8 and 12 essentially fall between midnight and 6 PM on Wednesday, October
5th, which was the day Governor Nikki Haley mandated most evacuations to begin.
Voluntary and mandatory evacuation orders were given for coastal Florida residents on
October 5th and 6th, and the departures for these days are also visible in the plot, primarily
between time steps 16 and 20, which correspond to a departure date of Thursday, October
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6th, between 6 AM and 9 PM. A more gradual, initial peak can be seen between steps 8 and
14, corresponding to all of Wednesday, October 5th. The mandatory evacuation order for
Georgia was given for Thursday, October 6th, showing a significant evacuation response,
followed by additional departures on time step 24, corresponding to Friday, October 7th,
between 9 AM and noon. While it is evident a number of variables are taken into
consideration in a household’s decision to evacuate, the sample data here may highlight
that an authoritative evacuation order is the primary triggering variable (Figure 4.11); it
may emphasize the necessity of timely action in order for successful evacuation procedures
to take place (positive feelings from those who did experience the evacuation) and, in the
event of a subsequent hurricane and evacuation, promote compliance.

Figure 4.11 (Left) Boxplot of departure time distributions by state
(Right) Least squares means diffogram – at α=0.05, no significant
difference between average departure times of Florida and South Carolina

4.2 Evacuation Response: Space-Time Cube and Emerging Hot Spot Analysis
For Florida, the space-time cube contains point counts for 435 locations over 15
time steps. Thirty-four of these (about 8%) contain at least one point for at least one time
interval; the 34 point locations make up 510 space-time bins, of which 95 (~19%) have
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point counts greater than zero. With a trend statistic of 1.25 and p=0.21, there is no
significant trend in the departure times of Florida. It is likely there is no significant
increasing or decreasing trend due to the nature of the Mann-Kendall trend test and the
undulating nature of the evacuation departures (day vs night), which may have simply
“averaged” out to no trend at all, especially in Florida where the evacuations were neither
ordered “too early” nor “too late”.
For Georgia, the space-time cube contains point counts for 44 locations over 14
time steps. Fifteen of these locations (~34%) contain at least one point for at least one time
interval; the 15 locations make up 210 space-time bins, of which 56 (~27%) have point
counts greater than zero. With a trend statistic of 1.73 and a p = 0.08, there is strong
evidence of an increasing departure trend in Georgia, even with the diurnal departure time
pattern. This is likely due to the state’s evacuation warnings being given later in the entirety
of the time period (Thursday, October 6th), effectively decreasing the available time for
evacuation procedures to be maintained as the storm approached.
For South Carolina, the space-time cube contains point counts for 208 locations
over 19 time intervals. 35 of these locations (~17%) contain at least one point for at least
one time interval; the 35 point locations make up 665 space-time bins, of which 120 (18%)
have point counts greater than zero. With a trend statistic of -1.5 and p = 0.13, there is
marginal evidence of a decreasing departure trend in South Carolina over the time period
of analysis (114 hours). The statistic agrees with the loess curve in Figure 4.10, which
demonstrates a slightly decreasing trend over the time period, likely due to the evacuation
orders being given well in advance of the storm’s arrival. In other words, with a longer lead

38

time, respondents who could or who wanted to leave earlier were able to leave, with fewer
people evacuating in the later time bins (i.e. closer to the arrival of the storm).
Each of the three states’ space-time cubes were used as input for the Emerging Hot
Spot Analysis; however, the tool revealed there were no hot or cold trends. Yet, when using
a single space-time cube for all three states using default values (time step interval = 8
hours; space-time bin distance interval = 8120 m by 8120 m), the Emerging Hot Spot
Analysis revealed 53 (out of a total 156) oscillating cold spot trends in the southern coastal
region of South Carolina and northern coastal region of Georgia (Figure 4.12).
As a reminder, an oscillating cold spot is “a statistically significant cold spot for
the final time-step interval that has a history of also being a statistically significant hot spot
during a prior time step, [and] less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been
statistically significant cold spots (Esri, Inc. 2016).” These areas were statistically
significant evacuation hot spots at one point due to the evacuation orders being given all at
once and inciting significant clusters of evacuees, but “cooled” into significant cold spots
by the final time-step interval as the possible evacuation window of opportunity closed on
storm approach. Very few people would evacuate from the hurricane in the final time step,
because by that point, the hurricane would already be there and it would be too late. In
other words, none of the eight possible kinds of hot spots can apply to the departure times,
because the final time step is not hot, and less than ninety percent of the time steps were
significant hot spots. There were no other trends identified. It is likely that Florida trends
were unidentifiable due to a combination of the sparse data over the fairly short period of
time (4-5 days), and the daytime/nighttime oscillation of few data points over a relatively
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large study area, there was not enough data overall to reveal any other significant spatial
and temporal trends using this particular tool.

Figure 4.12 Oscillating Cold Spot Trends in South Carolina and Georgia when using
a single space-time cube.
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4.3 Evacuation and Departure Time Analysis: Five Binary Logit Models
The differences in evacuation preferences and differences in departure times
necessitates the investigation of whether there are household-level variables that could
explain the variations in behavior. Five logistic regression models were specified and
estimated to address this part of the research questions. The first regression simply models
the relationship of evacuation (or non-evacuation) to the regressors listed previously in
Table 3.4, for the entire study period of four days. The other four model the relationship of
evacuation to the regressors listed in Table 3.5 for each of Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, and Day
4. In this way, we can begin to understand which variables significantly affected evacuation
timing during Hurricane Matthew, for this sample.
The purpose of the research presented is not to fully model evacuation behaviors,
nor predict them, because it is impossible due to the uniqueness of each hurricane
evacuation. However, measures of predictive power (i.e. R2 and Area Under Curve (AUC)
values) and goodness-of-fit (i.e. Hosmer-Lemeshow) are provided below to give an idea of
how much these models could improve by including other variables or interaction terms
(Table 4.1). The measures of predictive power for all five regressions are, in the context of
social science research, decent, although the range of values of the max-rescaled R2
(Nagelkerke-adjusted R2) of 0.0868 to 0.2721 might seem pretty low. There has been
discussion in statistics literature concerning the most appropriate methods of assessing
model fit for logistic regressions, namely, arguments on how R2 measures may or may not
be the most suitable. For instance, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, p. 167) opine:
“…Low R2 values in logistic regression are the norm and this presents a
problem when reporting their values to an audience accustomed to seeing
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linear regression values… Thus we do not recommend routine publishing
of R2 values from fitted logistic regression models. However, they may be
helpful in the model building state as a statistic to evaluate competing
models.”
While there may be issues with interpretation from a broader audience, R2 values are given
here because R2 is a very commonly provided measure-of-fit in statistical modeling.
Additionally, AUC values are provided, where 0.5 indicates a “failed” test (i.e. the model
randomly separates the group into evacuation and non-evacuation), and 1 indicates a very
good test (i.e. the test can correctly discriminate and classify those who evacuate or not).
The p-values from the Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) goodness-of-fit test are shown in the last
column, with p-values above 0.05 indicating an acceptable model fit.
Table 4.1 Predictive power and goodness-of-fit
Model
Total
Sample* 95%
Pseudo R2
AUC-ROC H-L
Pop.
Conf.
(Nagelkerke)
Interval
AllDays 3,814,112 561
± 4.14
0.2721
0.7600 (fair) 0.0563
Day1
3,814,112 383
± 5.01
0.0868
0.7071 (fair) 0.6792
Day2
3,814,112 383
± 5.01
0.1258
0.6568 (poor) 0.9999
Day3
3,814,112 383
± 5.01
0.1410
0.6747 (poor) 0.9999
Day4
3,814,112 383
± 5.01
0.1137
0.7044 (fair) 0.9841
*The sample for model AllDays includes both evacuees and non-evacuees. The samples
for models Day1-Day4 are only for evacuees who provided us with a departure time.
4.3.1 Model Results for Overall Evacuation Response
The results of the first model provide some insight to why a household evacuated
or did not evacuate (any contributions to evacuation responses from variables such as
number of pets or risk area awareness), during the entire study period. Under the logistic
model, there is strong evidence that the chance of a household evacuation changes with
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PREEXP (p=0.001), EVACORDER (p<0.0001), TELLSCORE (p=0.006), EVACZONE
(p=0.070), NPETS (0.055), and HHINC2015 (p=0.062), controlling for all other variables.
Table 4.2 shows the Type 3 Analysis of Effects output table based on the Wald ChiSquare test from PROC LOGISTIC. It indicates there is no evidence that evacuation is
related to STATE, WHOSCORE, HOWSCORE, FEMAZONE, NLIVHH, and
NAUTOHH. Essentially, over the duration of the evacuation for all three states, an
evacuation response from this sample depends on prior experience with hurricanes, receipt
of an evacuation order, how many subjects the respondent told about the evacuation,
whether they knew they live in a hurricane evacuation zone, the number of pets in the
household, and household income in 2015.
Table 4.2 Type 3 Analysis of Effects and significance.
Variables and p-values in bold are of strong to marginal
significance (p<0.15).
Type 3 Analysis of Effects
Effect
DF Wald Chi-Square
Pr > ChiSq
state
1
0.0277
0.8678
1
10.3059
preexp
0.0013
1
37.9446
evacorder
<.0001
whoscore
1
0.1324
0.7159
howscore
1
0.0785
0.7796
1
7.4852
tellscore
0.0062
2
5.3165
evaczone
0.0701
femazone
2
2.5469
0.2799
nlivhh
1
0.0807
0.7764
nautohh
1
0.3773
0.5391
1
3.6815
npets
0.0550
1
3.4965
hhinc2015
0.0615
The odds ratio estimates and 90% confidence intervals for the variables are provided in
Table 4.3. The results show:
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1. There is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuating for those without prior
hurricane experience are about twice the odds (=2.23) of evacuating for those with
prior experience.
2. There is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuating from Matthew for those
who received an evacuation order are about 4.8 times higher (=1/0.210) than those
who did not receive an evacuation order.
3. There is also very strong evidence that for those who told more subjects about the
order to evacuate, the odds of evacuating were greater – for a one unit increase in
the number of subjects the respondent told about the evacuation order, the odds of
evacuating increased by a factor of about 1.2.
4. There is strong evidence that the odds of evacuating from Matthew for those
a. Who think they know they live in an evacuation zone is about twice (=1/0.43)
those who think they know they do not live in an evacuation zone.
b. Who said they did not know whether they live in an evacuation zone are about
3 times higher (=1/0.34) than for those who think they know they do not live in
an evacuation zone.
5. There is strong evidence that for the households with more pets, the odds of
evacuating decreases – the odds of evacuating is about 10% higher per every one
unit decrease in the number of pets.
6. There is strong evidence that for households with higher incomes, the odds of
evacuating increases – the odds of evacuating is 17% higher per every unit increase
in the income category.
Table 4.3 Odds ratio estimates for evacuation and Wald confidence
intervals for the OR estimates
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Odds Ratio Estimates and Wald Confidence Intervals
Odds Ratio
Estimate
90% Confidence Limits
state
0.978
0.784
1.219
preexp no vs yes
2.226
1.477
3.354
evacorder no vs yes
0.21
0.139
0.319
whoscore
0.973
0.861
1.1
howscore
0.981
0.874
1.1
tellscore
1.225
1.084
1.384
evaczone no vs yes
0.43
0.208
0.889
evaczone no vs don't know
0.34
0.158
0.734
evaczone yes vs don't know
0.792
0.514
1.219
femazone no vs yes
0.711
0.476
1.062
femazone no vs don't know
0.717
0.465
1.106
femazone yes vs don't know
1.009
0.638
1.596
nlivhh
0.973
0.83
1.14
nautohh
0.923
0.744
1.144
npets
0.899
0.82
0.985
hhinc2015
1.173
1.019
1.349

4.3.2 Model Results for Day 1
Similarly to the regression results in the previous section, the results of the logistic
regression models for each day allow us to begin to assess the potential reasons for an
evacuation, but in these cases are framed by temporal contexts (i.e. why a household
evacuated when they did). The regression model for the first day (MODELD1 – Tuesday,
October 4) reveals that, under the logistic model, there is strong evidence that the chance a
household evacuates changes with STATE (which state they were from, i.e. the time of
evacuation order dissemination), and NAUTOHH, controlling for other variables. No other
variables met the 0.15 significance level to be entered into the model (Table 4.4).

45

Table 4.4 Variables meeting the criteria to enter the model via forward selection
Summary of Forward Selection – MODELD1
Step
Effect Entered DF Number In
Score Chi-Square
Pr > ChiSq
1 state
2
1
7.0659
0.0292
2 nautohh
1
2
3.4849
0.0619

The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates (Table 4.5) shows that, on the first day of
evacuation:
1. There is marginal evidence that for respondents living in South Carolina, the odds
of evacuating were over 3 times as large as the odds for those living in Georgia. In
essence, because the first evacuation orders were announced on Day 1 in South
Carolina (to begin officially on Day 2), people started to leave sooner in South
Carolina, which shows the importance of providing a mandatory evacuation order
with sufficient lead time. It is also important to note that there is no significant
difference between Florida and Georgia residents because, while some Florida
residents began to leave on the first day, orders for Florida were announced and
disseminated on the second day.
2. There is strong evidence that for every unit increase in NAUTOHH, the odds of
evacuating decreased by about 50% on the first day. This is not to say that
households with more cars were less likely to leave on the first day, simply because
they had more cars. While it could imply that it could simply be due to the
household deciding how many cars to take in the evacuation, there could be other
reasons for this statistical result (i.e. mediating variables), such as possibly having
a bigger household.
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Table 4.5 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates with coefficients and
exponentiated coefficients (i.e. Odds ratios - “Exp(Est)”)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates – MODELD1
Standard Wald ChiParameter
DF Estimate
Pr > ChiSq
Exp(Est)
Error
Square
Intercept
1 -2.5018
0.9648
6.7243
0.0095
0.082
state
SC
1
1.2370
0.7733
2.5586
0.1097
3.445
state
FL
1
0.0520
0.9312
0.0031
0.9555
1.053
nautohh
1 -0.6446
0.3411
3.5707
0.0588
0.525

4.3.3 Model Results for Days 2 and 3
The regression models for both the second and third days (MODELD2 –
Wednesday, October 5; MODELD3 – Thursday, October 6) reveal that there is very strong
evidence that the chance a household evacuates changes only with STATE, holding all
other variables fixed, and no other variables entered either of the models (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6 Variables meeting the criteria to enter both MODELD2 and
MODELD3 via forward selection
Summary of Forward Selection –
MODELD2 (Top row)
MODELD3 (Bottom row)
Step Effect Entered DF Number In Score Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
1
state
2
1
31.5844
<.0001
1
state
2
1
41.8648
<.0001

The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates (Table 4.7) shows:
1. There is very strong evidence that on Day 2 of evacuation, the odds of evacuation
for SC respondents is about 7 times that of GA respondents; the odds of evacuation
for FL respondents is about 4.7 times that of GA respondents.
2. On Day 3 of evacuation, there is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuation
for GA respondents is almost 5 times larger (=1/0.206) than the odds of evacuation
for SC respondents, while there is no strong evidence that the odds of evacuation
for GA respondents is any different from FL respondents.
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This essentially reveals there is very strong evidence that the chance a household evacuates
changes with evacuation order time or the day evacuations are announced, controlling for
all other variables. The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates shows that for
respondents who received an earlier evacuation order or anticipated receiving an
evacuation order, the odds of evacuating were greater than the odds of evacuating for those
who lived in states with later evacuation order times. In Figure 4.11 above, the least-squares
means diffogram showed no statistically significant difference between the departure times
of FL and SC residents, and differences between FL and GA, and SC and GA residents;
the odds ratios here show how big the relative differences are.
Table 4.7 (Top) Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates with coefficients and
exponentiated coefficients (i.e. Odds ratios - “Exp(Est)”).
(Bottom) Odds ratio estimates with 90% confidence intervals.
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates –
MODELD2 (Top 3 rows)
MODELD3 (Bottom 3 rows)
Standard
Wald ChiParameter
DF Estimate
Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est)
Error
Square
Intercept
1
-2.2454
0.3505
41.0328
<.0001
0.106
state
SC
1
1.9610
0.3820
26.3520
<.0001
7.107
state
FL
1
1.5389
0.4040
14.5071
0.0001
4.659
Intercept
1
0.8071
0.2233
13.0626
0.0003
2.241
state
SC
1
-1.5775
0.2757
32.7495
<.0001
0.206
state
FL
1
-0.4091
0.2950
1.9230
0.1655
0.664
Odds Ratio Estimates and Profile-Likelihood
Confidence Intervals –
MODELD2 (Top row)
MODELD3 (Bottom row)
Effect
state SC vs GA
state FL vs GA
state SC vs GA
state FL vs GA

Unit
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Estimate
7.107
4.659
0.206
0.664

48

90% Confidence
Limits
3.919
13.901
2.465
9.401
0.130
0.323
0.407
1.076

4.3.4 Model Results for Day 4
On Day 4 of the evacuation – Friday, October 7 – Hurricane Matthew was just off
the east coast of Florida as a Category 4 hurricane (next downgraded to a 3 on the same
day). The regression model for the fourth day (MODELD4) reveals there is strong evidence
that the chance a household evacuates changes with STATE, PREEXP, and
EVACORDER. No other variables met the significance criteria for entry into the model
(Table 4.8).
Table 4.8 Variables meeting the criteria to enter the model via forward
selection
Summary of Forward Selection – MODELD4
Step Effect Entered DF Number In Score Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
1 state
2
1
11.6024
0.0030
2 preexp
1
2
7.4620
0.0063
3 evacorder
1
3
3.2220
0.0727

The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates (Table 4.9) shows:
1. There is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuation for Georgia respondents
were about 6 times larger (=1/0.161) than for those living in Florida. Evacuations
were ordered for coastal Georgia on Thursday (Day 3), and most of the Florida
residents who could evacuate or who wanted to evacuate, probably would have
done so by this point, resulting in this difference.
2. There is strong evidence that the odds of evacuating for those with prior hurricane
experience were almost 2.5 larger (=1/0.404) than the odds of evacuating for those
without prior hurricane experience.
3. There is strong evidence that the odds of evacuating for those who did not receive
an order to evacuate were about twice as large as for those who had received an
order. For Day 4 of evacuation procedures, this could mean a heightened perception
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of risk for those who did not have to evacuate or were not mandated to evacuate,
based on their personal assessment of the storm track and strength. This could also
explain the second result concerning the evacuation of those with prior hurricane
experience. The importance of storm-specific physical factors in an individual’s
decision to evacuate or remain has been confirmed in previous research. This result
could also simply be a “statistical result,” whereby most of those who did receive
an order had already evacuated, so the only people who could still evacuate at this
point in time would be those who did not receive an evacuation order.

Table 4.9 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates with coefficients and
exponentiated coefficients (i.e. Odds ratios - “Exp(Est)”)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates – MODELD4
Standard
Wald ChiParameter
DF Estimate
Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est)
Error
Square
Intercept
1 -1.7525
0.1905
84.6732
<.0001
0.173
state
SC
1 -0.3311
0.3450
0.9214
0.3371
0.718
state
FL
1 -1.8267
0.5358
11.6212
0.0007
0.161
preexp
no
1 -0.9074
0.3673
6.1037
0.0135
0.404
evacorder no
1
0.7189
0.4060
3.1357
0.0766
2.052

4.4 Summary of Results
To answer the research questions regarding the existence and magnitude of any spatial
and temporal differences in evacuation behaviors, and subsequently, the household-level
variables contributing to such variations (especially in departure times), descriptive results
and results from space-time pattern analysis and logistic regression models were provided.
Overall, 62.2% of the Florida sample, 76.7% of the Georgia sample, and 67.1% of the
South Carolina sample evacuated, while 69.6% of Florida respondents, 90.6% of Georgia
respondents, and 71.8% of South Carolina respondents said they actually received an
evacuation order. Respondents from all three states cited the hurricane track as the primary

50

motivator to evacuate, while the hurricane’s strength was an additional motivator for
Florida respondents, and a secondary motivator for Georgia and South Carolina
respondents. In Florida, the primary factor contributing to non-evacuation was the path of
the hurricane, followed by concern for property, and the strength of the hurricane. Georgia
respondents cited both the strength and the track of the hurricane as primary factors for
non-evacuation, followed by traffic concerns. In South Carolina, the main influence for
remaining was the strength of the hurricane, followed by the path of the hurricane, and
concern for property.
The results of the space-time pattern analysis revealed no trends when assessing each
of the three states; however, when assessing all three states together using the tool’s default
inputs, a statistically significant cold spot (with hot spot history) was detected for the final
time interval in the southern coastal region of South Carolina and northern coastal region
of Georgia. This is likely a result of the evacuation orders being disseminated all at once
(especially for the Georgia coast), then evacuation no longer being an option as Matthew
neared the coast. However, in general, there was probably not enough appropriate data to
reveal any other significant spatial and temporal trends using this tool.
With regards to the variables contributing to an evacuation response, over the fourday duration of the evacuation for the entire sample, an observed evacuation depended on
not having prior hurricane experience, having received an evacuation order, an increased
level of communication about the evacuation order, believing one lived in an evacuation
zone, not knowing if one lived in an evacuation zone (i.e. knowledge of the risk area),
having fewer pets in the household, and higher household income in 2015. However, only
12 variables were used as inputs to the logistic regression, so it is likely that there could be
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other variables explaining why someone evacuated or did not evacuate. While STATE did
not contribute to the overall evacuation response (i.e. was not significant in the first logistic
regression for the overall time period), STATE was the only variable which was significant
for each of the four days’ logistic regressions. Essentially, for each day, there were
consistent differences in evacuation between the states.
The descriptive results provided makes clear that a number of variables are taken into
consideration in a household’s decision to evacuate, but the results from the subsequent
analyses, namely the logistic regression models, may highlight that an authoritative
evacuation order is the primary triggering variable. The results emphasize the necessity of
timely action in order for successful evacuation procedures to take place (for example,
positive feelings from those who did experience the evacuation) and, in the event of a
subsequent hurricane and evacuation, promote compliance.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This research set out to assess spatial and temporal differences in evacuation
behaviors during Hurricane Matthew, taking into account certain household-level variables
that could explain such differences, influencing decision-making and evacuation behavior,
especially time of departure. Specifically, it set out to answer whether there were any
spatial and temporal differences in Hurricane Matthew evacuation behaviors along the
coasts of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina; If so, what were the differences, and are
there individual or household-level variables that could lead to such differences, especially
in the amount of time between warning issuance and the initiation of protective action?
Through a survey of coastal residents, descriptive statistical results, space-time analysis,
and logistic regression models, results show that there are many finer differences in
evacuation behaviors, but the timing between South Carolina and Georgia, and Florida and
Georgia presented a significant difference. Not only do the statistical results show this, but
comments from the survey respondents reflect this difference as well. So, while Hurricane
Matthew presented a threat to the eastern coastline of the three states for the duration of
the forecast from the first mention of a part of the contiguous US (i.e. the coastline was
contained in the cone of uncertainty from NHC advisory 22 through 43), and while
mandatory evacuation orders appear to be of a tertiary influence in evacuation according
to the respondents, the timing of departures in this sample are different between the three
states because the evacuation orders triggered the behavioral response. Whether the orders
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resulted directly in a household’s evacuation response, or resulted in a household
researching the storm specific variables which then convinced them to leave, or resulted in
a household discussing possible options with friends or neighbors, the influence of the
authoritative recommendation should not be overlooked; this emphasizes the significance
of a timely evacuation order.
For the full binary logistic regression model, it is interesting how only one of the
milling factor scores, TELLSCORE, showed strong evidence of changing the probability
of evacuation. Receiving information is, in a way, passive, so from whom and what modes
people received evacuation information may not influence a “successful” outcome.
Actively telling others about the evacuation order may be a sign of an individual’s or
household’s participation or interest in the event.
Prior research shows there is evidence that pet ownership decreases the chance of
evacuation for that household (Whitehead 2003; Bowser and Cutter 2015). The results of
the full logistic regression model shows there is evidence for a negative effect of NPETS
on evacuation (p=0.055), which provides further confirmatory evidence of how pet
ownership places constraints on evacuation behavior. In contrast, in prior research,
household income plays an inconsistent or nonsignificant role in evacuation behavior
(Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a); in this study, there is marginal evidence that the
probability of evacuation increases with every increase in categories of HHINC2015.
However, one must take into account that income is often confounded with other variables
such as risk area (Baker 1991) and take caution with the interpretation provided. It may
seem that in this sample, having a higher income implies having more resources to be able
to leave (e.g. being able to afford a hotel or motel, being able to take time off of work), but
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it could also be that households in more expensive waterfront properties felt the need to
evacuate due to their physical susceptibility.
Concerning a household’s spatial awareness, not knowing whether one lives in an
evacuation zone compared to those who do know, increased the chance of evacuating. If a
respondent did not actually live in an evacuation zone but felt it was necessary to evacuate,
it could contribute to a phenomenon called “shadow evacuation” where those who are not
ordered to do so end up evacuating anyway. For instance, on Day 4 of the evacuation, the
logistic regression model showed higher odds of evacuating for people who did not receive
an evacuation order. Sometimes, large shadow evacuations can result in increased traffic
congestion and provide significant barriers to evacuating for those who may need to do so.
Such barriers may lead a household to not evacuate in the next hurricane, which emphasizes
the need of communicating to and educating the public on where one resides in relation to
risk areas. The results (refer to section 4.1) concerning the percentage of evacuees from
non-evacuation zones could potentially reflect a large evacuation shadow response for
Florida and South Carolina, potentially due to spatial and temporal contexts of Matthew.
For instance, hurricane Hermine struck Florida about a month before Matthew as a weaker
storm and managed to disturb electric power for certain municipalities for a length of time,
and in 2015, damaging and life-threatening flooding occurred across South Carolina.
However, interpreting these results as the occurrence of a large evacuation shadow may
not be an entirely appropriate assumption to make. A respondent may live in a mobile home
or low-lying area, and while not in an evacuation zone, per se, they may have evacuated
due to their susceptibility, and often specific orders for these physically vulnerable
populations.
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The result in the overall logit model that reveals an evacuation during the days prior
to Matthew’s landfall depends on reception of an evacuation order confirms past research
on the significance of recommendations for protective actions from public officials.
Moreover, in the logistic regression models for each day, the state variable was the only
variable entered for each of the four days. It is a difficult variable to interpret – the
observation of an evacuation and its timing depends on the state – but understanding that
the relative differences between the states (e.g. odds ratios, least squares means diffogram,
space-time cube trend statistics) generally matches the times the official recommendations
were disseminated provides some clarity.
However, statistical results do not convey the experience of individuals in an
evacuation, which are important to consider. Survey respondents were allowed to write
comments at the end of the online survey. While a few comments from Georgia residents
were mainly positive, a number of comments mentioned difficulties finding information
on evacuation, resorting to using information from South Carolina and Florida, and the
evacuation order(s) being issued too late to evacuate (see select quotes from GA
respondents below). These comments agree with the previous research and the results from
the logistic regressions, and also help explain the relatively higher proportion of Georgia
respondents rating Georgia’s handling of the evacuation as somewhere between “very
poor” and “average” (refer to Figure 4.9). While it is difficult to order an evacuation when
it is entirely possible the track could shift and residents could subsequently be frustrated at
having to endure an “unnecessary” evacuation, it seems that providing clear and timely
information to those who need it would ensure the evacuation occurs safely and
swimmingly.
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Quotes taken verbatim from survey:
·

Georgia waited too long to issue the evacuation.

·

It was VERY difficult to find information on evacuation. I'm not a Facebook
user and I had to look there to get community info from police. We were totally
in the dark about it all until an unexpected text message arrived to say
evacuation was lifted.

·

It appeared that the state was the only one considering all surrounding states
that did not know what to do and when. It also appeared that Camden County
was the worst of the counties during this period.

·

I thought the governor should have been on TV earlier giving GA residents
information. Most of our information was from the FL governor. We live
close to JAX so we just followed his instructions.

·

The EMA did a poor job at keeping the public informed. The EMA of Camden
County didn't issue an evacuation order until late Thursday afternoon.

·

It appeared to me and some neighbors that Gov Deal was forced to "up his
game" due to the excellent response of Gov Haley in SC. He appeared
uninterested until the storm was closing-in on the Ga coast.

·

Most of the information available was from South Carolina. We had little
information available from Georgia. We ended up calling local police
department to know when and what would be involved in returning. This was
not just my opinion, it was the opinion of many. We called each other by
phone, Atlanta, Augusta, and other towns to compare information. Most had
little. This was one of the worst evacuations that I have experienced, and
because of lack of information, and timely, evacuation notice.

·

Not everyone has Facebook so other information output methods would be
helpful

·

Make the mandatory evacuation sooner and make employees not demand that
employees return to work the day after the hurricane.

·

SC was so good, and the Georgia state government was way behind the 8ball.

·

The state office waited to long to call the evac. Greater advanced notice can
save lives and property. Re entry was handled poorly, local authorities did
not communicate with each other.

·

I felt the state should have gotten involved a little quicker than what they did,
knowing that the hurricane was heading in our direction.

57

·

We should follow SC lead next time. They handled it more effectively than
Ga.

·

We depended on a local radio group that had non stop coverage during the
storm and aftermath. Cema and local government should have a person
assigned to assist with information to the radio stations. I know TV stations
had coverage, but we have Comcast so we lost signal at beginning of storm.
The evacuation notices were not clear and seemed to come very late.

With regards to the influence of past hurricane experience on evacuation response,
previous research results have been inconsistent. In this study, there was strong evidence
that having no past hurricane experience significantly increased the chance of an
evacuation. Reasons for this could be that more experienced individuals or households feel
more prepared to weather a hurricane, or that past hurricanes were not as severe or
dangerous to necessitate an evacuation. Another reason could be that past hurricane
experiences were regarded as inconvenient false alarms compounded by concerns of traffic
and not being able to return home promptly. A number of the responses (see below for
select comments from FL, GA, SC) not only complained about the delay in returning home,
but also were incredibly frustrated with the lack of communication about the delay in
returning home. There seemed to be different pieces of information for the evacuees being
able to return, as in some locations, officials lifted the evacuation/gave the all-clear, while
at the same time law enforcement authorities did not allow residents to re-enter the area(s).
Quotes taken verbatim from survey:
Georgia
·

After hurricane Floyd did not to get in the massive traffic jam.

·

The city of Brunswick had a unique experience with re-entry. The city
announced that everyone was allowed to return with no
limitations/exceptions, but the state troopers blocked the on/off ramps and
refused re-entry to anyone, including residents. For an entire day, they redirected people attempting to re-enter Brunswick around and around a loop.
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The troopers were not helpful in providing information, and even prohibited
our local news reporters (who stayed to keep locals informed about the
situation) from entering the city. This experience will definitely negatively
factor into any future decision to evacuate.
·

Would probably leave for a stronger hurricane or more direct hit. Neighbors
had trouble returning home, which discourages some from evacuating.

·

One major concern of evacuating was the difficulty of returning home. We
stayed and would have had to wait several days to return home to check on
our house.
Florida

·

Governor overplayed evacuation requirements

·

I would evacuate as a last choice. Being on a peninsula, you stand a good
chance of being stuck on the road. Also, the hurricanes change direction and
unless it's a cat 5, I'd stay put.

·

Our gated community is .4 mile from the Atlantic. A limb hit our deck railing
causing light damage otherwise we were totally untouched. Next time I'll
stay.

·

I will be better parpared the next time. and leave early or stay on the island
like most of my family this was not a good experience just like Floyd, or move
out of this state.
South Carolina

·

They needed to let the residents back in sooner than they did. This will effect
my decision to stay or go for the next Hurricane.

·

We'd consider evacuation for future anticipated hurricane strikes to the
Lowcountry, as we'll never forget experiencing Hurricane Hugo at a friend's
new home in Goose Creek. However, the state government's never-failing
interminable delay in allowing property owners to return home and secure
their structure(s) and belongings prohibits us in good conscience from
seriously considering actually making an evacuation unless there's a 90+%
probability of absolute total destruction in the southern Dorchester County
area.

·

The Governor was totally hysterical and raised too much public alarm for a
minor hurricane. I will not evacuate next time unless I am convinced by my
own evaluation that the hurricane is truly dangerous. I wasted over $900 in
travel and hotel expenses for a totally unnecessary evacuation. The
evacuation order should have been restricted strictly to coastal areas/islands.
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Too many people were evacuated causing chaos and too many people on the
roads.
·

Due to return process delay of 3 days, not sure we will evacuate next time.
Again, here, while the statistical result adds to previous research, the comments

above illustrate how having hurricane experience (and evacuation experience) can change
the probabilities of evacuation for a future hurricane. These comments reinforce the
importance of consistent and accessible communication after the hurricane, explicitly
stating the reasons behind “unnecessary” evacuations and being “banned” from returning
until it is safe to do so (e.g. more efficient debris clearing). All of the results (quantitative
and qualitative) emphasize the necessity of both well-timed official recommendations for
people to take protective actions and effective communication, during the pre- and poststorm phases, which could help encourage reluctant coastal individuals/households to
evacuate in a future hurricane.
The analyses presented in this thesis aim to provide some insight into the evacuation
behaviors in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina during Hurricane Matthew in October
2016 by employing GIS tools, statistical tests and logistic modeling. The research primarily
focuses on reviewing some of the differences in behavioral responses and assessing the
contribution of a subset of survey variables on observations of evacuation for the four-day
time period, and breaks down the analyses by day to assess which variables significantly
contribute to an early, timely, or later evacuation.
While it is impossible to model human behaviors to full capacity, the aim of this
work was to contribute to the wealth of hurricane evacuation literature and potentially
reveal some new information by incorporating behavioral factors in the analysis of
evacuation timing. The next steps for research using this data should investigate this
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sample’s level of representativeness of the population, analyze the entire variable list to
determine which other variables contributed to evacuation during Hurricane Matthew, or
possibly break down the logistic regression for the overall time period by state. With
regards to hurricane evacuation research in general, the limitations discovered in this
research presents opportunities – decreasing survey response rates over time, missing
responses in the dataset, or time and monetary costs of conducting survey research, should
push us to consider other complementary sources of data. However, it must be made clear
that other novel methods of assessing evacuation responses probably will not address the
question of why an individual or household did or did not evacuate. Yet, with more data
and complete data, possibly aggregated from multiple sources (e.g. obtaining from a survey
a higher response rate with fewer skipped questions, combined with tracking and
transportation data), better results could come from similar analyses, with a more complete
picture of variables that contribute to household departure timing.
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APPENDIX A: NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER ADVISORIES 26 THROUGH 43
AND ASSOCIATED WATCHES AND WARNINGS

This appendix provides more context to the study area, namely, the physical threat
presented along the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coasts. Shown here are the
hurricane watches and warnings from the National Hurricane Center’s forecast advisories
26 through 43, as they were the advisories with the first and last watch/warning of the study
area. The information from these forecast advisories were acquired from the Hurricane
Matthew Advisory Archive, which can be accessed at
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2016/MATTHEW.shtml.
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ADV
NUM

DATE

WARNING

26 10/4/2016

27 10/4/2016

28 10/5/2016 NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH TO
SEBASTIAN
INLET LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
29 10/5/2016 NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH TO
SEBASTIAN
INLET LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
30 10/5/2016 NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH TO
THE
FLAGLER/VO
LUSIA
COUNTY LINE
LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
31 10/5/2016 NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH TO
THE
FLAGLER/VO
LUSIA
COUNTY LINE
LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
32 10/6/2016 NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH TO

WATCH

STORM
LOCATION

DEERFIELD
18.9N, 74.3W
BEACH TO THE
VOLUSIA/BREVA
RD COUNTY
LINE
GOLDEN BEACH 19.8N, 74.3W
TO THE
VOLUSIA/BREVA
RD COUNTY
LINE
NORTH OF
20.4N, 74.4W
SEBASTIAN
INLET TO THE
FLAGLER/VOLUS
IA COUNTY LINE
NORTH OF
SEBASTIAN
INLET TO THE
FERNANDINA
BEACH

MAX
SUS
WIND
125 KT

120 KT

115 KT

21.1N, 74.6W

110 KT

NORTH OF THE
21.8N, 75.2W
FLAGLER/VOLUS
IA COUNTY LINE
TO FERNANDINA
BEACH

105 KT

NORTH OF THE
22.5N, 75.7W
FLAGLER/VOLUS
IA COUNTY LINE
TO SAVANNAH
RIVER

105 KT

NORTH OF
FERNANDINA

100 KT
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23.4N, 76.4W

33 10/6/2016

34 10/6/2016

35 10/6/2016

36 10/7/2016

37 10/7/2016

38 10/7/2016

39 10/7/2016

FERNANDINA
BEACH LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH
FLORIDA TO
ALTAMAHA
SOUND
GEORGIA
LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH
FLORIDA TO
EDISTO
BEACH
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
NORTH OF
GOLDEN
BEACH TO
SOUTH
SANTEE
RIVER LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
BOCA RATON
TO SOUTH
SANTEE
RIVER LAKE
OKEECHOBEE
JUPITER
INLET TO
SOUTH
SANTEE
RIVER
COCOA
BEACH TO
SURF CITY
NORTH OF
FLAGLER/VO
LUSIA

BEACH TO
EDISTO BEACH
NORTH OF
ALTAMAHA
SOUND TO
SOUTH SANTEE
RIVER SOUTH
CAROLINA

24.2N, 77.1W

110 KT

NORTH OF
EDISTO BEACH
TO SOUTH
SANTEE RIVER
SOUTH
CAROLINA

25.1N, 77.8W

120 KT

26.2N, 78.6W

120 KT

27.1N, 79.2W

115 KT

28.2N, 80.0W

105 KT

29.4N, 80.5W

105 KT

30.2N, 80.7W

95 KT

NORTH OF SURF
CITY TO CAPE
LOOKOUT
NORTH OF SURF
CITY TO CAPE
LOOKOUT
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COUNTY LINE
TO SURF CITY

40 10/8/2016 NORTH OF
FERNANDINA
BEACH TO
SURF CITY
41 10/8/2016 NORTH OF
ALTAMAHA
SOUND TO
SURF CITY
42 10/8/2016 NORTH OF
ALTAMAHA
SOUND TO
SURF CITY
43 10/8/2016 NORTH OF
SOUTH OF
SANTEE
RIVER TO
SURF CITY

NORTH OF SURF
CITY TO CAPE
LOOKOUT

31.2N, 80.5W

90 KT

NORTH OF SURF
CITY TO CAPE
LOOKOUT

32.0N, 80.5W

90 KT

NORTH OF SURF
CITY TO CAPE
LOOKOUT

33.0N, 79.4W

65 KT

NORTH OF SURF
CITY TO CAPE
LOOKOUT

33.8N, 78.2W

65 KT
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
This appendix provides the online survey which randomly selected participants
had the choice to take. Questions are shown in the left column, with multiple choice
responses or open-ended responses denoted in the right-hand column. Binary choices are
denoted with a “(Y/N)” for a yes or no response. Only a few of these variables were
analyzed in this thesis.
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RespondentID
CollectorID
StartDate
EndDate
IP Address
If you agree to participate in the survey, please
enter the letter and number code printed on the
mailing label above your name.
Prior to Hurricane Matthew, have you ever personally
experienced a hurricane?
Prior to Hurricane Matthew, have you ever evacuated
from a hurricane before? (If response to previous
question was No or Don’t know, this question was
skipped.)
Where did you go? Please check all that apply.

Where was this located? Please enter the city and the
state.
Were you ordered to evacuate for Hurricane Matthew?
At any time after the Governor issued an evacuation
order, did you attempt to get more information about
what you should do from any of the following
sources? Please check all that apply.
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Open-Ended Response
Response (Y/N/Don’t
know)

Response (Y/N)
Airbnb
Church or place of
worship
Home of a friend or
relative in my county
Home of a friend or
relative outside of my
county
Hotel or motel
Pet-friendly hotel or
motel
Pet-friendly public
shelter
Public shelter (or Red
Cross shelter)
Workplace
Don't know or don't
remember
Other (please specify)
Open-Ended Response
Response (Y/N)

Didn't try to get more
information
Co-worker
Employer
Family member
Friend

Local police or sheriff's
office
Neighbor
Relative
State Office for
Emergency Services
State Governor's office
Other (please specify)
At any time after the Governor issued an evacuation
order, how did you get more information? Please
check all that apply.

At any time after the Governor issued an evacuation
order, did you tell anyone else about the order to
evacuate? Please check all that apply.

Did you evacuate in response to Hurricane Matthew?
(Depending on response, remaining questions were
either skipped or included.)
Which factors influenced your decision to evacuate?
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E-mail message
Face-to-face from
another person (friend,
family, co-worker,
employer)
Internet
Radio
Social media such as
Twitter or Facebook
Telephone call--land line
or cell phone
Television
Text message
Tone alert radio
Did not try to get more
information
Other (please specify)
Did not share
information with others
Co-workers
Employer
Family members
Friends
Neighbors
Relatives
Other (please specify)

Response (Y/N)
Advice from local
officials
Advice from media

What day did you leave your home?

Approximately what time did you leave your home?
How long (hours) did it take to reach your
destination?
How many people in your household evacuated,
including yourself?
How many vehicles did your household take?
What city and state were you evacuating from?
What city and state did you go to?

Concern for safety of
family and friends
Mandatory evacuation
order
Storm path of hurricane
Strength of hurricane
Traffic concerns
Other (please specify)
Tuesday October 4
Wednesday October 5
Thursday October 6
Friday October 7
Saturday October 8
Other (please specify)
Between midnight and 6
am
Between 6 am to 9 am
Between 9 am to noon
Between noon to 3 pm
Between 3 pm to 6 pm
Between 6 pm to 9 pm
Between 9 pm and
midnight
Response
Response
Response
Open-Ended Response
Open-Ended Response

Which highways did you take? Please check all that
apply.
On what date did you return to your home?

How much did you spend on evacuation related costs,
in dollars? Please enter a whole number (no dollar
sign or any other text).
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(These options varied
between Florida,
Georgia, and South
Carolina, and an open
response option was also
provided.)
Response
Other (please specify the
date)

Open-Ended Response

Dogs - Number
evacuated
Cats - Number evacuated
Other - Number
evacuated

How many pets evacuated with you?

What type of facility did you and your household stay
in during your evacuation? Please check all that apply.

Which factors influenced your decision to remain and
not evacuate? Please check all that apply.

Which of the following sources did you rely on for
evacuation notices and storm updates and to what
extent? Please rate each source.

74

Airbnb
Church or place of
worship
Home of a friend or
relative
Hotel or motel
Pet-friendly hotel or
motel
Pet-friendly public
shelter
Public shelter (or Red
Cross shelter)
Workplace
Other (please specify)
Concern for pets
Concern for property
Concern about where to
stay
Cost of evacuation
Lack of transportation
Needed to work
Strength of hurricane
Storm path of hurricane
Traffic concerns
Other (please specify)

Internet
Family, friends or
neighbors
Local radio stations
Local television stations
National news (e.g. Fox,
CNN)
NOAA weather radio
Newspapers
Other TV cable stations

Do you live in a hurricane evacuation zone?
Is your home located in a FEMA flood zone?
Including yourself, how many people live in your
household?
Of these people, how many people are
How many automobiles do you have in your
household?
How many pets do you have?

During which months of the year do you most often
stay at this address? Please check all that apply.

How long have you lived at this address, in years?
Do you own or rent?
Do you have a mortgage?
Which of the following best describes the type
of housing unit at this address?
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Social media
Weather Channel
Response
Response
Response
under 18 - Number
over 65 - Number
Response
Cats - Number
Dogs - Number
Other - Number
Year round residence
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Open-Ended Response
Response
Response (Y/N/Don’t
know)
Detached single family
home
Apartment building or
condominium, more than
4 stories
Apartment building or
condominium, less than 4
stories
Duplex or other multifamily structure
Mobile home or
manufactured housing

When was the structure built? Please type in the year.
How much damage did your home receive?

Are you male or female?
What is the highest grade you've completed?
In what year were you born?
Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?
What do you consider your racial background?
Which of the following best describes your total
household income in 2015?
If you have a cell phone, are you registered
with CodeRed Emergency Alerts system from
SCEMD?
In your opinion, how do you rate the state's overall
handling of the hurricane evacuation?

Thank you for your responses. If there is anything
else you would like us to know about your evacuation
experience or the state's management of the
evacuation process, please provide any additional
comments below.
If you would like to be entered into a drawing to win
an iPad Mini Wi-fi (16GB, $399 value), please enter
your name and either your email address or your
mailing address so that we may contact you if your
number is selected.
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Other (please specify)
Open-Ended Response
None
Slight
Moderate
Major
Response
Response
Response
Response (Y/N)
Response
Other (please specify)
Response
Response (Y/N; South
Carolina only)
Very poor
Below average
Average
Above average
Excellent

Open-Ended Response

Open-Ended Response

